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Abstract
Cryptosystems based on codes in the rank metric were introduced in 1991 by
Gabidulin, Paramanov, and Tretjakov (GPT) and have been studied as a promising
alternative to cryptosystems based on codes in the Hamming metric. In particular,
it was observed that the combinatorial solution for solving the rank analogy of
the syndrome decoding problem appears significantly harder. Early proposals were
often made with an underlying Gabidulin code structure. Gibson, in 1995, made
a promising attack which was later extended by Overbeck in 2008 to cryptanalyze
many of the systems in the literature. Improved systems were then designed to resist
the attack of Overbeck and yet continue to use Gabidulin codes. In this paper,
we generalize Overbeck’s attack to break the GPT cryptosystem for all possible
parameter sets, and then generalize the attack to cryptanalyze particular variants
which explicitly resist the attack of Overbeck.
1 Introduction
Cryptosystems based on the hardness of the general decoding problem have received
much attention because of their applications to post-quantum cryptography. The practi-
cal implementation of these systems, however, has suffered from the drawback of having
a large key size relative to RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Regardless, coding
based cryptography remains one of the most feasible alternatives to traditional number
theoretic cryptosystems for resisting quantum attacks such as Shor’s factoring algorithm.
A large body of work has been produced in the study of cryptography based on codes in
the Hamming metric, starting with McEliece in 1978 [14]. It was observed that the cryp-
tosystem he designed had efficient encryption and decryption procedures, however, the
proposed public key sizes were significantly larger than keys for RSA or ECC, rendering
the system infeasible in its original form.
∗This work was supported by SNF grant no. 149716.
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The large size of the key in the McEliece cryptosystem is a consequence of the ef-
ficiency of combinatorial solutions to the general decoding problem for codes in the
Hamming metric. The impetus for interest in codes in the rank metric were preliminary
results concerning the rank syndrome decoding problem, in which the best algorithms
were of significantly higher complexity [2, 16]. This indicated that cryptosystems could
be designed with far smaller parameters than those in the Hamming metric. Cryptosys-
tems based on codes in the rank metric were introduced earlier by Gabidulin, Paramonov,
and Tretjakov (GPT) [5]. Since then, proposals for designs of cryptosystems have alter-
nately been attacked and modified. The designs are often based on Gabidulin codes–the
rank metric analogy of generalized Reed-Solomon codes–because of the scarcity of effi-
ciently decodable codes in the rank metric. This has led to efficient structural attacks
[9, 17] and subsequently improvements in the designs of these codes and their parameters
[12, 4, 18, 13]. It should be noted that unlike the syndrome decoding problem in the
Hamming metric, the rank syndrome decoding problem is not known to be NP-hard.
Other related work has been done in improving algorithms for the rank syndrome decod-
ing problem [7], and also designing rank-metric based cryptosystems which do not rely
on Gabidulin codes [8].
The original GPT cryptosystem had its first significant attack by Gibson [9]. Fol-
lowing Gibson’s lead, Overbeck proposed an alternative attack that led to a polynomial
time break for many parameters of the GPT cryptosystem [17]. In the wake of these de-
velopments, two modifications, designed to use Gabidulin codes and yet resist the attack
of Overbeck, stand out. They follow a similar idea - a more careful choice of distortion
matrix - but have different approaches. The approach taken in [13] is based on enlarging
the distortion matrix but restricting its rank, whereas the idea in [18] is based on careful
design of the structure of the distortion matrix. While the ideas in these modifications
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, an disadvantage of the former version is that it
requires a large increase in the public key size in order to be secure against Overbeck’s at-
tack. A disadvantage of the latter version is that the distortion matrices must necessarily
be quite structured.
In this paper we present a new attack which can be seen as a generalization of
Overbeck’s, and which allows us to cryptanalyze the systems presented in [18] and [13].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some terminology as well as the
necessary background regarding rank metric codes and the GPT cryptosystem and its
variants. Section 3 provides some basic results that we will need to describe our attack.
In particular, we need some basic results about Moore matrices as well as the behavior of
matrices under the coordinate-wise Frobenius map. Section 4 outlines the attack on the
GPT cryptosystem and Section 5 uses the method to cryptanalyze the aforementioned
variants.
2 Background
Let F ⊂ E be two fields with [E : F] = m. We will refer to the rank in the following ways.
Given a matrix M with coefficients in E, we mean by the rank of M , the usual notion
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of the dimension of the row span of M as a vector space over E. We will denote the
row span of a matrix M over E by 〈M〉. By column rank (over F) of a matrix M with
coefficients in E, we mean the rank of the column span ofM as an F-vector space and we
will denote this by colrk(M). When we say the rank of a vector, x ∈ En, we mean the
F-rank of the matrix obtained by expanding x into an m× n matrix according to some
basis of E over F. The rank defined in this way is invariant with respect to the choice of
basis. An equivalent way to express the rank of a vector x ∈ En is to take the dimension
over F of the subspace of E which is spanned by the coordinates of x.
If we are working over a base field F = Fq of cardinality q, and an extension field
E = Fqm , then we denote by [i] the ith Frobenius power, q
i. The Frobenius map can be
applied to a matrix or vector coordinate-wise. If M = (Ma,b) is any matrix (or vector)
over Fqm , we define M
([i]) = (M
[i]
a,b). It is easy to verify that 〈M〉
([i]) = {x([i]) | x ∈
〈M〉} = 〈M ([i])〉.
Definition 2.1. The rank distance between x,y ∈ Fnqm is defined to be
dR(x,y) = rk(x− y).
This defines a metric on Fnqm . If V is a subspace of Fqm , the minimum rank distance
of V is given by
dminR (V ) = min{dR(x, 0) | x ∈ V }.
We will also use the term weight of x, denoted by wtR(x), to mean dR(x, 0).
The Singleton bound for (linear) rank-metric codes is given by the inequality (see e.g.
[3])
dminR (V ) ≤ n− dim(V ) + 1.
Definition 2.2. A rank-metric code meeting the Singleton bound is called a maximum
rank-distance (MRD) code.
The linear isometries of Fnqm with respect to the rank metric are given by (F
∗
qm) ×
GLn(Fq) [1]. Throughout the paper we will make extensive use of the coordinate-wise
Frobenius map. This map is a semi-linear isometry of the rank-metric with many useful
properties. For more information on semi-linear isometries, see [15].
Definition 2.3. A matrix M ∈ Fk×nqm is called a Moore matrix if there exists a α ∈ F
n
qm
such that row i of M is equal to α([i−1]) for i = 1, . . . , k. α is called the generator of M .
In the following lemma, we will summarize some of the important properties of Moore
matrices. These results are known or are direct consequences of known results.
Lemma 2.4. Fix k ≤ N , and let M ∈ Fk×Nqm be a Moore matrix with generator α, with
rk(α) = n ≤ N .
1. If k ≤ n, then 〈M〉 has dimension k, and minimum rank distance n− k + 1.
2. If k < n, then dim(〈M〉 ∩ 〈M〉(q)) = k − 1 and dim(〈M〉 + 〈M〉(q)) = k + 1.
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3. If A ∈ Fk×Nqm is another Moore matrix thenM+A is also a Moore matrix. Moreover,
if the column rank of A is equal to r < n− k+ 1, then the minimum rank distance
of 〈M +A〉 is at least n− k + 1− r.
4. If the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉 is d > 1, then the minimum rank distance of
〈M〉+ 〈M ([1])〉 is equal to d− 1.
5. If the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉 is d > 1, and E ∈ F
N×(N−s)
q is a full rank
matrix, then ME is a Moore matrix and the minimum rank distance of 〈ME〉 =
〈M〉E is at least d− s.
Proof. 1. The case n = N is given in Theorems 6 and 7 of [3]. Thus we know that,
if N > n, we can puncture the vector space 〈M〉 to get a space 〈M ′〉 of length
n, dimension k and minimum rank distance n − k + 1. Hence the minimum rank
distance of 〈M〉 is at least n−k+1. That it cannot be greater follows from Lemma
4.7 of [11].
2. The first statement follows easily from the Moore matrix structure. This implies
that
dim(〈M〉+ 〈M (q)〉) = dim(〈M〉) + dim(〈M (q)〉)− dim(〈M〉 ∩ 〈M〉(q)) = k + 1.
3. The first statement follows from the fact that (x+y)[i] = x[i]+y[i] for any x, y ∈ Fqm .
Therefore the Moore structure is preserved under addition of matrices. For the
second part note that any element a ∈ 〈A〉 has rank at most r and any non-zero
element mi ∈ 〈M〉 has rank at least n − k + 1. Hence a can change the rank of
m± a by at most r, i.e. the rank of any non-zero element of 〈M +A〉 has rank at
least n− k + 1− r.
4. Since the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉 is d > 1, it follows from 2. that dim(〈M〉+
〈M ([1])〉) = k + 1. Then part 1. implies that the minimum rank distance of 〈M〉+
〈M ([1])〉 is n− (k + 1) + 1 = d− 1.
5. Let E′ ∈ Fn×sq be such that [E | E
′] has full rank. Then, [E | E′] is an isometry,
and so 〈G[E | E′]〉 has minimum rank distance d. Removing the last s columns
gives 〈GE〉, which can only decrease the rank by at most s.
A well-known class of codes in the rank metric are the Gabidulin codes [3]. Gabidulin
codes are those whose generator matrix is a Moore matrix in which the generating vector
has full rank:
Definition 2.5. Fix k ≤ n ≤ m, and let α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ F
n
qm , rk(α) = n. The
Gabidulin code of length n and dimension k over Fqm , denoted by Gabn,k(α) is given by
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the row space of the matrix,
G =


α1 α2 . . . αn
α
[1]
1 α
[1]
2 . . . α
[1]
n
...
α
[k−1]
1 α
[k−1]
2 . . . α
[k−1]
n .

 . (1)
From Lemma 2.4, we have that Gabidulin codes are MRD codes. Moreover, they
have efficient decoding algorithms [20, 21, 3]. Gabidulin codes are also closed under the
linear isometries of the rank-metric (for isometries of rank-metric codes see e.g. [1, 15]).
Specifically, if β ∈ F∗qm and σ ∈ GLn(Fq), then βGabn,k(α)σ = Gabn,k(βασ).
2.1 Decoding From an Arbitrary Generator Matrix
McEliece cryptosystems based on Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes were effec-
tively broken by Sidel’nikov-Shestakov [19]. Their attack allows one to recover the gener-
ating vector of a GRS code, and therefore a decoding algorithm. Similarly, in the case of
Gabidulin codes, a decoding algorithm can be found if one knows the canonical generator
matrix of the code. Using a simple method, we can also recover a decoding algorithm if
the generator matrix is not in canonical form, as described in the following.
Consider the Gabidulin code Gabn,k(α) with dimension 1 < k < n and generator ma-
trix SG, where S ∈ GLk(Fqm) and G of the form (1). Then Gabn,k(α)
([1])∩Gabn,k(α) is
the Gabidulin code Gabn,k−1(α
([1])) (see Lemma 2.4). Iterating with this new Gabidulin
code, we can eventually obtain a code of dimension 1, which is generated by α([k−1]). If
we take some non-zero element of this space, it has the form βα([k−1]), for some β ∈ Fqm .
Applying the Frobenius map coordinate-wise m− k + 1 times, we obtain an element of
the form β[m−k+1]α. Using this element, we can construct a generator matrix, BG, for
Gabn,k(α) which will have the form
BG =


β[m−k+1]
β[m−k+2]
. . .
β




α1 α2 . . . αn
α
[1]
1 α
[1]
2 . . . α
[1]
n
...
α
[k−1]
1 α
[k−1]
2 . . . α
[k−1]
n

 .
The change of basis from SG to BG is then given by BS−1. For a message m ∈ Fkqm ,
encoded as mSG, we can now decode with respect to Gabn,k(β
[m−k+1]α) to obtain
mSB−1. Then, applying BS−1, we can recover m.
2.2 GPT and GGPT Cryptosystems
Let S ∈ GLk(Fqm), G ∈ F
k×n
qm be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, say Gabn,k(α),
capable of correcting t′ errors, and X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column rank t < t
′. We
define
Gpub := SG+X. (2)
5
We call a GPT cryptosystem one in which the public key is given by the pair
κpub = (Gpub, t
′ − t), (3)
and the private key is given by
κpvt = (G,S). (4)
An encryption of a message m ∈ Fkqm is given by
mGpub + e =mSG+mX + e,
where e ∈ Fnqm is a randomly chosen vector of rank at most t
′ − t. The product mS can
be recovered from a decoding algorithm for Gabn,k(α) because all elements of 〈X〉 have
weight at most t. Specifically, if wtR(e) ≤ t
′ − t,
wtR(mX + e) ≤ wtR(mX) + wtR(e) ≤ t
′.
Inverting S, the message m can then be recovered. We will call the elements of the form
mX the designed error associated with the encryption of m, and X the designed error
matrix.
In [18, 13] the authors consider an alternative version which we call the generalized
GPT (GGPT) cryptosystem. This system uses a public matrix of the form
Gˆpub := S[X | G]σ ∈ F
k×(n+tˆ)
qm , (5)
where G is as before, X ∈ Fk×tˆqm is a matrix of column rank tˆ, S ∈ GLk(Fqm), and
σ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq). The public key is given by
κpub = (Gˆpub, t
′), (6)
and the private key is given by
κpvt = (G,S, σ). (7)
In the GGPT cryptosystem, an encryption of m ∈ Fkqm is given by
mGˆpub + e,
with rk(e) ≤ t′. To recover m, one first computes
(mGˆpub + e)σ
−1,
and then ignores the first tˆ coordinates. Decoding the last n coordinates with respect to
Gabn,k(α), one obtains mS, and by applying S
−1, the message m can be recovered.
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2.3 Overbeck’s Attack
We will describe Overbeck’s attack from [17] for the case of the GGPT cryptosystem;
the attack for the GPT case is analogous. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix for
the Gabidulin code, Gabn,k(α). The first step in Overbeck’s attack is to consider the
extended matrix (for some u ≥ 1)
Gext :=


S[X | G]σ
(S[X | G]σ)([1])
...
(S[X | G]σ)([u])

 = S˜


X G
X([1]) G([1])
...
...
X([u]) G([u])

σ.
Since the n right-most columns of Gextσ
−1 span the Gabidulin code Gabk+u(α), the
matrix can be brought into the form of
G′ext = S˜
′
(
X∗ G∗
X∗∗ 0
)
σ, (8)
by some suitable row transformation, where X∗ ∈ F
(k+u)×tˆ
qm , G
∗ ∈ F
(k+u)×n
qm is a gener-
ator matrix of Gabk+u(α), and X
∗∗ ∈ F
(k−1)u×tˆ
qm . If X
∗∗ has rank tˆ, then any element
of 〈G′ext〉
⊥ = 〈Gext〉
⊥ has the form σ−1[0 | h], where h ∈ Gabk+u(α)
⊥. With this
information one can reconstruct the code Gabn,k(α) and recover the encrypted message.
In the case when X∗∗ does not have full rank, Overbeck’s attack fails, since Gabn,k(α)
cannot be reconstructed from the dual of 〈Gext〉
⊥. This is why, in [13], Loidreau suggests
to use a randomly chosen X of low rank, a, since then the rank of X∗∗ can be bounded
above. Specifically, to resist Overbeck’s attack, one should choose tˆ > (n−k)a. However,
this would drastically increase the key size of the cryptosystem. To avoid this problem
of large key size, the Smart Approach considered in [18], is to design X in a structured
way so that X∗∗ is rank-deficient, without necessarily having to increase tˆ. However the
structure of X makes the Smart Approach more vulnerable to attacks. A more detailed
description of these two systems is given in Section 5.
3 Preliminary Results
In this section, we show that one can decompose a matrix (or vector) of low column rank
into the product of two matrices, one of which has full column rank, and the other with
elements restricted to Fq. Moreover, we prove some results about the coordinate-wise
Frobenius map, as well as the structure of the designed error matrix, which we will need
later on in our attack.
We will denote by Mt×n,r(Fq) the set of t × n matrices over Fq with rank r. The
sphere around the origin of rank radius t in Fnqm will be denoted by
SRn,t(Fqm) := {x ∈ F
n
qm | rk(x) = t}.
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Proposition 3.1.
SRn,t(Fqm)
∼= SRt,t(Fqm)×Mt×n,t(Fq)/GLt(Fq),
where Mt×n,t(Fq)/GLt(Fq) is the set of equivalence classes of t × n matrices over Fq of
rank t, where two matrices are equivalent if they have the same row span.
Proof. As representatives of the cosets in Mt×n(Fq)/GLt(Fq) we consider the reduced
row echelon form of the respective row span of the elements of the coset. Define the map
ϕ : SRt,t(Fqm)×Mt×n(Fq)/GLt(Fq) −→ S
R
n,t(Fqm)
(v, U) 7−→ vU.
We now show that ϕ is bijective.
We first show that ϕ is surjective. For this consider an arbitrary element in the image
of ϕ, i.e. a vector x ∈ Fnqm of rank t, and let xi1 , . . . , xit be the first t independent entries
of x, in positions i1, . . . , it. Then, the remaining n − t entries of x can be expressed as
an Fq-linear combination of xi1 , . . . , xit , thus we can write x = (xi1 , . . . , xit)M for some
matrix M ∈ Ft×nq . Then there exists S ∈ GLt(Fq) such that U = S −M is in reduced
row echelon form. We get (xi1 , . . . , xit)S ∈ S
R
t,t(Fqm) and x = ϕ((xi1 , . . . , xit)S,U), thus
ϕ is surjective.
To show injectivity, suppose that there are two preimages, i.e. x = ϕ(v, U) =
ϕ(v′, U ′). Without loss of generality, we can assume that U = [It | ∗]. Denote by
U ′j the jth column of U
′. Then we have
(x1, . . . , xt) = v = (v
′U ′1, . . . ,v
′U ′t).
Since v has rank t, U ′1, . . . , U
′
t must be non-zero. Because U
′ is in reduced row echelon
form, we get U ′ = [It | ∗] and hence
(x1, . . . , xt) = v = v
′.
We furthermore have xj = vUj = v
′U ′j for j = t+ 1, . . . , n. Thus
vUj = v
′U ′j ⇐⇒ vUj = vU
′
j ⇐⇒ v(Uj − U
′
j) = 0.
Since rk(v) = t, we get Uj − U
′
j = 0 for j = t + 1, . . . , n. Thus U = U
′ and we have
shown that ϕ is injective.
One can think of the space Mt×n,t(Fq)/GLt(Fq) as a set of matrices parameterizing
the Grassmannian Gr(t,Fnq ), i.e. the space of t-dimensional subspaces of F
n
q . According
to the proof of Proposition 3.1, we can express a vector x of rank t as x = xˆU for any
matrix representation U of a certain element of the Grassmannian Gr(t,Fnq ).
We can easily extend the result of Proposition 3.1 from vectors of rank t to matrices
of column rank t. Then we get the following result.
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Corollary 3.2. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of rank k and column rank t. Then there
exist V ∈ Fk×tqm with rk(V ) = k and U ∈ F
t×n
q with rk(U) = t, such that
X = V U.
Definition 3.3. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of rank k and column rank t and V ∈
Fk×tqm , U ∈ F
t×n
q such that X = V U . We call 〈U〉 the Grassmann support of X which
will be denoted by 〈U〉 = suppGr(X). By abuse of notation we will also call any matrix
representation U ∈ Ft×nq of this space the Grassmann support of X.
Lemma 3.4. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of rank k and column rank t ≥ k. Then
〈X〉 ⊆ suppGr(X) and the inclusion is strict if and only if t > k.
Proof. Let U ∈ Ft×nq be the Grassmann support of X. By Corollary 3.2, we can write
X = V U for some V ∈ Fk×tqm . Thus every row of X is a Fqm-linear combination of the
rows of U , which implies that 〈X〉 ⊆ 〈U〉. Since dim(〈U〉) = t and dim(〈X〉) = k, we get
equality if and only if k = t.
The following two lemmas are needed to prove the main results of this section in
Theorems 3.7 and 3.10.
Lemma 3.5. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column rank t and S ∈ GLk(Fqm). Then,
SX also has column rank t.
Proof. Denote the ith column of X by Xi. Assume that SX has column rank less than
t, i.e. for any i1 < · · · < it ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exist a1, . . . , at ∈ Fq such that
t∑
ℓ=1
aℓ(SX)iℓ = 0 ⇐⇒ S
t∑
ℓ=1
aℓXiℓ = 0 ⇐⇒
t∑
ℓ=1
aℓXiℓ = 0.
This is a contradiction to the fact that the column rank of X is t.
The following properties of the coordinate-wise Frobenius map will be used through-
out the paper. The first statement follows straightforwardly from the Fq-linearity of the
Frobenius map, the second and the third are known and can be found, for instance, in
[10, 11].
Lemma 3.6. The following hold for any prime power q and 0 < n ≤ m.
1. Let x ∈ Fnqm have rank r. Then, x
(q) also has rank r.
2. Let M ∈ GLn(Fqm). Then, (M
−1)(q) = (M (q))−1.
3. Let S ⊂ Fnqm be an Fqm-subspace. Then, S
(q) = S if and only if S has a basis
contained in Fnq .
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We saw in Lemma 3.4 that if a matrix X, with Grassmann support U , has column
rank which is greater than its rank, then 〈X〉 ( 〈U〉. The following theorem shows that
we can use the Frobenius map to recover 〈U〉 from X.
Theorem 3.7. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm be a matrix of column rank s. Then, for any ℓ ≥ 0,
s−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]) =
s+ℓ∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]) = suppGr(X).
In particular,
dim
(
s−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])
)
= s.
Proof. The chain of subspaces
〈X〉 ⊆ 〈X〉+ 〈X〉(q) ⊆
2∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]) ⊆ . . .
must eventually stabilize. Let ℓ be such that,
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]) =
ℓ∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]).
Define s′ := dim
∑ℓ−1
i=0〈X〉
([i]). We have(
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])
)(q)
=
ℓ∑
i=1
〈X〉([i]) ⊆
ℓ∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]) = 〈X〉([ℓ]) +
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]).
By Lemma 2.4, dim
∑ℓ−1
i=0〈X〉
([i]) =
(
dim
∑ℓ−1
i=0〈X〉
([i])
)(q)
= s′. Hence, we must have
(
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])
)(q)
=
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i]),
and therefore we can use the third point of Lemma 3.6 and express the sum on the
right as the row space of a matrix U ′ ∈ Fs
′×n
q of (column) rank s
′. Thus there exists
S ∈ GLkℓ(Fqm) such that 

X
X([1])
...
X([ℓ−1])

 = S
(
U ′
0
)
.
This implies that 〈X〉 ⊆ 〈U ′〉. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that s′ ≥ s. Moreover, by
Lemma 3.5, the above matrix on the left has column rank s′. Since, by the Fq-linearity
of the Frobenius, the column rank of this matrix is equal to the column rank of X we
get s = s′ and hence suppGr(X) = 〈U
′〉.
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Note that a matrix X ∈ Fnqm can always be decomposed into a Moore matrix compo-
nent XMoore and a non-Moore matrix component Z as
X = XMoore + Z.
Definition 3.8. We will call such a decomposition a Moore decomposition. There exists
a Moore decomposition so that the non-Moore component has lowest possible column
rank. In this case, we call the Moore decomposition a minimum column rank Moore
decomposition.
Proposition 3.9 shows that, regardless of the choice of Moore decomposition, the
Grassmann support of a non-Moore matrix component of a minimum column rank Moore
decomposition is the same.
Proposition 3.9. Suppose that X ∈ Fk×nqm is a matrix which has minimum column rank
Moore decomposition X = AMoore+A, where AMoore is a Moore matrix, and A has column
rank s. Then, any other minimum column rank Moore decomposition X = BMoore + B
satisfies that suppGr(A) = suppGr(B).
Proof. Let A have Grassmann support U , and B have Grassmann support V . I.e., we
can write A = A′U and B = B′V with U, V ∈ Fs×nq of full rank. Let E ∈ F
(n−s)×n
q be a
parity check matrix for 〈V 〉. Then,
BMooreE
T = XET −BET = XET = AMooreE
T +AET ,
which yields
(BMoore −AMoore)E
T = AET .
Since E is a matrix over Fq, (BMoore − AMoore)E
T is a Moore matrix, therefore the
matrix AET must be a Moore matrix as well. This gives that (AET )i = (A1E
T )([i−1]) =
A
([i−1])
1 E
T for i = 2, . . . , k. Since A itself is not necessarily a Moore matrix, row i of A
must be of the form Ai ∈ A
([i−1])
1 + ker(E), for i = 1, . . . , k. Then, we can write
A =


A1
A
([1])
1
...
A
([k−1])
1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A¯
+


κ1
κ2
...
κk


︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ′V
,
for κ1, . . . , κk ∈ ker(E) = 〈V 〉 and κ
′ ∈ Fk×sqm . If we let F ∈ F
(n−s)×n
q be a parity check
matrix for 〈U〉, then AF T = A′UF T = 0 and hence in particular A1F
T = 0. Since F is
a matrix over Fq, we also get A
([i])
1 F
T = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Hence,
0 = AF T = A¯F T + κ′V F T = κ′V F T .
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Since X = (AMoore + A¯) + κ
′V is also a Moore decomposition of X, then the column
rank of κ′V must be equal to s and so 〈V 〉 = 〈κ′V 〉. Thus,
〈V 〉F T = 0,
and therefore, 〈V 〉 = 〈U〉, so the Grassmann supports of A and B are the same.
Theorem 3.10. Let M ∈ Fk×nqm be a Moore matrix and X ∈ F
k×n
qm be of column rank
s, where s is the rank of the non-Moore component in a minimum column rank Moore
decomposition of X. Then, we have
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i]) =
s∑
i=0
〈M〉([i]) + suppGr(X).
Proof. Let U ∈ Fs×nq be the Grassmann support of X. Moreover, let Xi,Mi denote the
ith row of X and M respectively, and let
X ′ =


X
([1])
1 −X2
X
([1])
2 −X3
...
X
([1])
k−1 −Xk

 ,M∗ =


M1
M
([1])
1
...
M
([k+s−1])
1

 ,X∗ =


X1
X
([1])
1
...
X
([s−1])
1
X
([s])
1
X
([s])
2
...
X
([s])
k


.
Then the space
∑s
i=0〈M +X〉
([i]) is generated by the row span of

M +X
(M +X)([1])
...
(M +X)([s])

 = S˜


M∗ +X∗
X ′
...
(X ′)([s−1])

 , (9)
for a suitable row transformation matrix S˜. Since U ∈ Fs×nq we have U
([i]) = U for i ≥ 0.
It follows that the rows of X ′ are elements of 〈U〉, which implies that the Grassmann
support 〈U ′〉 of X ′ is a subspace of 〈U〉 and hence that X ′ has column rank s′ ≤ s. By
Theorem 3.7,
s′−1∑
i=0
〈X ′〉([i]) =
s−1∑
i=0
〈X ′〉([i]) = 〈U ′〉 ⊆ 〈U〉.
We now want to show that 〈U ′〉 = 〈U〉. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
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the rank of U ′ is strictly smaller than s. We write X as a Moore decomposition
X =


X1
X2
...
Xk

 =


X1
X
([1])
1
...
X
([k−1])
1

+


0
X2 −X
([1])
1
...
Xk −X
([k−1])
1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′′
.
We note that Xi+1−X
[1]
i ∈ 〈U
′〉 for i = 1, ..., k − 1. Starting from the first non-zero row
of X ′′, it follows that
(X2 −X
([1])
1 )
([1]) = X
([1])
2 −X
([2])
1 ∈ 〈U
′〉
which implies
X
([1])
2 −X
([2])
1 − (X
([1])
2 −X3) ∈ 〈U
′〉
⇐⇒ X3 −X
([2])
1 ∈ 〈U
′〉.
We recognize this as the second non-zero row of X ′′. Continuing in this fashion, we
can obtain that every row of X ′′ must belong to U ′. Hence, X ′′ has column rank at
most s′ < s. However, this contradicts the fact that the minimal column rank Moore
decomposition has non-Moore part with column rank s. Therefore, by Proposition 3.9,
U ′ has rank s and we have 〈U ′〉 = 〈U〉.
Hence, we have shown that the row space of the second matrix in (9) is equal to the
row space of (
M∗ +X∗
U
)
which is in turn equal to the row space of(
M∗
U
)
,
because we can cancel X∗ by taking suitable elements of 〈U〉, since 〈X∗〉 ⊆ 〈U ′〉 = 〈U〉.
This implies the statement.
Lemma 3.11. Let X ∈ Fk×nqm have minimum column rank Moore decomposition, X =
XMoore + Z. Then,
suppGr(XMoore) + suppGr(Z) = suppGr(X).
In particular, colrk(XMoore) ≤ colrk(X).
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Proof. Define ℓ := max(colrk(X), colrk(XMoore)). Using Theorems 3.7 and 3.10, we have
suppGr(X) =
ℓ∑
i=0
〈X〉([i])
=
ℓ∑
i=0
〈XMoore + Z〉
([i])
=
ℓ∑
i=0
〈XMoore〉
([i]) + suppGr(Z)
= suppGr(XMoore) + suppGr(Z).
Corollary 3.12. Let M ∈ Fk×Nqm be a Moore matrix and X be of column rank t with
minimum column rank Moore decomposition X = XMoore + Z, where colrk(Z) = s.
Suppose that dRmin(〈M〉) ≥ s+ t+ 2. Then, all elements of rank one in
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i]),
belong to suppGr(X). Moreover, if s = t, the elements of rank one exactly span suppGr(X) =
suppGr(Z).
Proof. Let U be the subspace spanned by all elements of rank one in
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i]).
From Lemma 3.11, if X = XMoore + Z, is a minimum column rank decomposition, then
we know that suppGr(Z) ⊆ suppGr(X). Let H ∈ F
(n−t)×n
q be parity check matrix for
suppGr(X). From Lemma 2.4, we have
dRmin
(
s∑
i=0
〈M +X〉([i])HT
)
= dRmin
(
s∑
i=0
〈M〉([i])HT
)
≥ (s+ t+ 2)− s− t
= 2.
Since H is a matrix over Fq, we get wtR(x) ≤ wtR(xH), and therefore we must have
that U ⊆ suppGr(X). By Theorem 3.10, suppGr(Z) ⊆ U and if s = t then suppGr(Z) =
suppGr(X). Therefore we have
suppGr(Z) = U = suppGr(X).
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To set up our attack in Section 4, we need to find the elements of rank one in a linear
rank metric code efficiently. To accomplish this, we only need to find the codewords that
have all coordinates in Fq (all other rank one codewords are multiples of these). The
following lemma shows how these codewords in Fnq can be computed.
Lemma 3.13. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be in reduced row echelon form and denote by Gi the i-th
row of G. Then the solutions to
k∑
i=1
ai(G
([1])
i −Gi) = 0, (10)
for variables ai ∈ Fq, represent the codewords of 〈G〉 in F
n
q .
Proof. Any codeword can be written as an Fqm-linear combination of the rows of G.
Since all rows of G have their pivot equal to 1, a codeword with entries only in Fq needs
to be an Fq-linear combination of the rows. Thus, we get that any codeword in F
n
q can
be written as
∑k
i=1 aiGi for some ai ∈ Fq. Furthermore, we know that
v ∈ Fnq ⇐⇒ v
([1]) − v = 0,
hence
k∑
i=1
aiGi ∈ F
n
q ⇐⇒
k∑
i=1
ai(G
([1])
i −Gi) = 0.
When expanded over Fq, Equation (10) gives rise to a linear system of equations with
k variables, which can efficiently be solved with standard methods.
4 Cryptanalysis of the GPT Cryptosystem
In this section we explain our new attack to break the GPT cryptosystem, as defined in
Subsection 2.2. Our attack extends Overbeck’s attack to cryptanalyze the system for all
parameters. In Section 5, we show how this same idea can be used to cryptanalyze the
GGPT variant.
Recall that the public key generator matrix is of the form
Gpub := SG+X ∈ F
k×n
qm ,
where G is a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code Gabn,k(α), X ∈ F
k×n
qm is a matrix of
column rank t, and S ∈ GLk(Fqm).
Note that, as an attacker, we do not have a priori knowledge of the parameter s (the
column rank of the non-Moore part in the minimal column rank Moore decomposition
of X). We can generally assume s = t, or else start with s = 1 and increase the value up
to t until the attack succeeds.
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Theorem 4.1. Consider a GPT cryptosystem as defined in Subsection 2.2, with public
key generator matrix Gpub = SG + X ∈ F
k×n
qm . Let S
−1X = XMoore + Z be a minimal
column rank Moore decomposition with s = colrk(Z). Suppose an adversary can find a
full rank matrix U ∈ Fs
′×n
q for s ≤ s
′ ≤ t satisfying
suppGr(Z) ⊆ 〈U〉 ⊆ suppGr(X),
then an encrypted message from a public key of the form (3) can be recovered in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Let H ∈ F
(n−s′)×n
q be a parity check matrix for 〈U〉. Applying H to the public
key generator matrix yields
GpubH
T = (SG+X)HT = S(G+XMoore)H
T .
From Lemma 3.11 we know that colrk(XMoore) ≤ t. Then, from Lemma 2.4, it follows
that 〈G + XMoore〉 has minimum rank distance at least n − k + 1 − t, and that 〈G +
XMooreH
T 〉 has minimum rank distance at least n− k + 1− (t+ s′). Moreover, GHT +
XMooreH
T is a Moore matrix.
From the minimum distance we know that there are n− (t+s′) independent columns
in this matrix, which generate a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n− (t+s′)−k+1,
Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ), for some γ ∈ F
n−(t+s′)
qm . From Subsection 2.1, we can recover a decoding
algorithm for Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) with respect to the submatrix formed by these n− (t+ s
′)
columns. The error correction capability of Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) is⌊
n− (t+ s′)− k
2
⌋
=
⌊
t′ −
t+ s′
2
⌋
≥ t′ − t ≥ rk(e) ≥ rk(eHT ),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that H is a matrix over Fq. For an
encrypted message m(SG+X) + e, we have
(m(SG+X) + e)HT =mS(GHT +XMooreH
T ) + eHT .
When we restrict this to the above chosen independent columns, we can uniquely decode
in the respective code Gabn−(t+s′),k(γ) and can therefore recover m.
We can now use the previous result to attack and break the GPT cryptosystem.
Corollary 4.2. Consider a GPT cryptosystem as defined in Subsection 2.2 with public
key generator matrix Gpub = SG+X ∈ F
k×n
qm . For any such cryptosystem, an encrypted
message can be recovered in polynomial time.
Proof. As before, let S−1X = XMoore + Z be a minimal column rank Moore decompo-
sition. Denote by s the column rank of Z. We first note that dRmin(〈G〉) ≥ s + t + 2,
since
dRmin(〈G〉) − 1
2
≥
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
= t′ > t ≥
s+ t
2
.
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By Corollary 3.12, all the elements of rank one in
∑s
i=0〈G+X〉
([i]) belong to the Grass-
mann support of X. With Lemma 3.13 we can find a basis matrix U ∈ Fs
′×n
q for these
elements of rank one in polynomial time. We have 〈U〉 ⊆ suppGr(X). On the other hand,
by Theorem 3.10, suppGr(Z) ⊆
∑s
i=0〈G+X〉
([i]). Thus, we also have suppGr(Z) ⊆ 〈U〉.
Therefore we can use Theorem 4.1 to recover the encrypted message.
5 Cryptanalysis of GGPT Variants
In this section we adapt our attack to break the GGPT cryptosystem, as defined in
Subsection 2.2. To do so we will consider two variants of the GGPT separately. However,
in both subsections we will consider a public key generator matrix of the form
Gˆpub := S[X | G]σ ∈ F
k×(n+tˆ)
qm ,
where G is a generator matrix of some Gabidulin code Gabn,k(α), X ∈ F
k×tˆ
qm is a matrix
of column rank tˆ, S ∈ GLk(Fqm), and σ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq).
5.1 Smart Approach Variant
Recall from Subection 2.3 that we can put the extended matrix into the form
G′ext = S˜
′
(
X∗ G∗
X∗∗ 0
)
σ.
Rashwan et al. in [18] proposed what they call the Smart Approach (SA). In this setting,
they note that if X ∈ Fk×tˆqm is constructed from a Moore matrix of column rank a and
a non-Moore component of column rank tˆ − a, then X∗∗ will have rank tˆ − a. The
paper gives no suggestions for design parameters of such a system. However, one implicit
advantage of this construction is the ability to predict the rank of X∗∗, and therefore to
be able to reduce the public key by choosing a smaller designed error matrix.
In the SA variant we can write X = XMoore + Z as a minimal column rank Moore
decomposition, where XMoore has column rank a and Z has column rank tˆ− a. We can
then rewrite
Gˆpub = S[XMoore | G]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+S[Z | 0]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
. (11)
X ′ is a matrix of column rank tˆ−a and S−1M is a Moore matrix generating a code with
minimum rank distance at least n− k + 1.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a GGPT cryptosystem as defined above. Suppose an adversary
can find a matrix U ′ ∈ F
(tˆ−a)×(tˆ+n)
q , such that 〈U ′〉 = suppGr([Z | 0]σ) = suppGr(X
′).
Then an encrypted message from a public key of the form (5) can be recovered in poly-
nomial time.
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Proof. We note that U ′ must be of the form U ′ = [U | 0]σ, where U ∈ F
(tˆ−a)×tˆ
q is such
that suppGr(Z) = 〈U〉. Let HU ∈ F
a×tˆ
q be a parity check matrix for U . A parity check
matrix HU ′ ∈ F
(a+n)×(tˆ+n)
q for U ′ must be of the form
(HU ′)
T = σ−1
[
HTU 0tˆ×n
0n×a In
]
A,
for some A ∈ GLn+a(Fq).
We compute
Gˆpub(HU ′)
T = S[XMoore | G]σ(HU ′)
T + S[Z | 0]σ(HU ′)
T
= S[XMoore | G]
[
HTU 0tˆ×n
0n×a In
]
A
= S[XMooreH
T
U | G]A.
[XMooreH
T
U | G]A is again a Moore matrix, generating a code of minimum distance at
least n−k+1. Hence, we can find n independent columns of Gˆpub(HU ′)
T which will form
a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n−k+1. Denote these columns by i = (i1, . . . in)
and the corresponding submatrix by Gi. From Section 2.1, we can recover a decoding
algorithm for 〈Gi〉 with respect to Gi.
We note that if e is an error of rank at most t′, and we denote by e′ the subvector of
e(HU ′)
T corresponding to columns i, then
rk(e′) ≤ rk(e(HU ′)
T ) ≤ rk(e) ≤ t′.
If we apply HU ′ to an encrypted message of the form mGˆpub + e, we obtain
mGˆpub(HU ′)
T + e(HU ′)
T .
Restricting to the coordinates i, we obtain
mGi + e
′,
which we can decode in the code 〈Gi〉 to recover m, since the error correction capability
of 〈Gi〉 is t
′ ≥ rk(e′).
Corollary 5.2. Consider a GGPT cryptosystem as defined above. If
tˆ− a <
n− k − 1
2
we can recover an encrypted message in polynomial time.
Proof. Recall that
Gˆpub = S[XMoore | G]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+S[Z | 0]σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
X′
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is a minimum column rank Moore decomposition. Then S−1Gˆpub = S
−1M + S−1X ′ is
also a minimal column rank Moore decomposition. S−1M is a Moore matrix generating
a code of minimum rank distance at least n − k + 1. Since, by the condition of this
corollary,
n− k + 1 ≥ 2(tˆ− a) + 2,
it follows from Corollary 3.12 that all elements of rank one in
tˆ−a∑
i=0
〈Gˆpub〉
([i]) =
tˆ−a∑
i=0
〈S−1Gˆpub〉
([i]) =
tˆ−a∑
i=0
〈S−1M + S−1X ′〉([i])
span the space suppGr(X
′) = suppGr([Z | 0]σ). We can use Lemma 3.13 to find these
elements of rank one, and obtain U ′ ∈ F
(tˆ−a)×(tˆ+n)
q such that 〈U ′〉 = suppGr(X
′). Then
we can use Theorem 5.1 to recover the message.
The following example illustrates a case when Overbeck’s attack fails, but our attack
recovers the encrypted message.
Example 5.3. Let q = 2, n = 8, k = 3, tˆ = 3, a = 1 and g1, . . . , g8 ∈ F28 linearly
independent over F2. Consider the generator matrix of a Gabidulin code
G =

 g1 g2 . . . g8g([1])1 g([1])2 . . . g([1])8
g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8

 ,
and, for some x ∈ F28\F2, the matrices
XMoore =

 x 0 0x([1]) 0 0
x([2]) 0 0

 , Z =

 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0

 .
Let
X = XMoore + Z
and the public key generator matrix be
Gˆpub = [X | G] =

 x 1 1 g1 g2 . . . g8x([1]) + 1 0 1 g([1])1 g([1])2 . . . g([1])8
x([2]) + 1 1 0 g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8

 .
For simplicity we let S = I3 and σ = I11. We choose u = 1 and construct Gext, which
can be put in the form
G′ext =


x 0 0 g1 g2 . . . g8
x([1]) 0 0 g
([1])
1 g
([1])
2 . . . g
([1])
8
x([2]) 0 0 g
([2])
1 g
([2])
2 . . . g
([2])
8
x([3]) 0 0 g
([3])
1 g
([3])
2 . . . g
([3])
8
1 0 1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 1 0 . . . 0 0


=
(
X∗ G∗
X∗∗ 0
)
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by a suitable row transformation. Here Overbeck’s attack fails, because X∗∗ does not
have full rank. On the other hand, our attack succeeds, since we can directly recover the
elements of rank one as 〈[X∗∗ | 0]〉 = 〈[Z | 0]〉. Thus we can use Theorem 5.1 and recover
any encrypted message.
5.2 Loidreau’s GGPT Variant
As already mentioned in Subsection 2.3, in Loidreau’s GGPT variant [13] the designed
error matrix, X ∈ Fk×tˆqm , is a randomly chosen matrix of rank a < tˆ/(n − k). We can
assume that X has column rank tˆ. In this case, to find the Grassmann support of X
with the help of Theorem 3.7, we need to go up to the (tˆ− 1)-st Frobenius power. But,
since
tˆ− 1 > a(n− k)− 1 ≥ n− k − 1,
we get that
tˆ−1∑
i=0
G([i]) =
n−k−1∑
i=0
G([i]) = Fnqm ,
hence the elements of rank one cannot help us reconstruct the Grassmann support of X.
Thus the attack of Subsection 5.1 would not succeed.
However, in this case, we can still use the idea of locating the elements of rank one;
but now we want to recover the elements of the Gabidulin part of the code, instead of
the Grassmann support of X. The strategy is effectively the same, although we must
make some assumptions on the behavior of X and random subcodes of Gabidulin codes.
First, we note that there is a suitable row transformation, T , so that
TGˆpub =
(
X∗ G∗
0 G∗∗
)
σ, (12)
where X∗ ∈ Fa×tˆqm is a matrix with the same row span as X, and G
∗ and G∗∗ are matrices
which span subcodes of 〈G〉. One can easily see that 〈[X∗ | G∗]σ〉 and 〈[0 | G∗∗]σ〉
intersect trivially. Our strategy will be to use the purely Gabidulin part [0 | G∗∗] to
generate a parity check matrix for [X∗ | 0].
We will now state the assumptions that we will use in our attack. These assumptions
are justified with experimental results in Table 1.
Assumption 1. Let G ∈ Fk×nqm be a generator matrix of a Gabidulin code, and B ⊂ 〈G〉
be a random subspace of 〈G〉 of codimension a. Set
ℓ =
⌈
n
k − a
⌉
. (13)
With high probability, we have
ℓ−1∑
i=0
B([i(k−a)]) = Fnqm. (14)
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m n k a tˆ Assumption 1 Assumption 2
24 24 12 3 40 ∼ 1 ∼ 1
24 24 12 4 52 ∼ .998 ∼ 1
Table 1: Experimental results for Assumptions 1 and 2: Probabilities of success in 1000
trials for q = 2.
The value of ℓ in (13) is the smallest possible value for which we can obtain equality
in (14). One could choose ℓ larger than in (13), which we will remark on in the end of
this section.
Since we can expect a random matrix whose rank is small relative to the dimen-
sion of the ambient space to not contain elements of rank one, we make the additional
assumption:
Assumption 2. Let X ∈ Fk×tˆqm be a random matrix of rank a. For ℓ given in (13), if
ℓa≪ tˆ, then with high probability,
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X〉([i(k−a)])
contains no elements of rank one.
Theorem 5.4. Let S ∈ GLk(Fqm), σ ∈ GLn+tˆ(Fq), G ∈ F
k×n
qm , and X ∈ F
k×tˆ
qm be of rank
a, and consider Loidreau’s GGPT variant with public key
Gˆpub = S[X | G]σ.
If Assumptions 1 and 2 are true, then we can break the Loidreau GGPT variant in
polynomial time with high probability.
Proof. Let ℓ be as in (13) and TGˆpub as in (12). Consider the matrix
G′′ext :=


Gˆpub
Gˆ
([k−a])
pub
...
Gˆ
([(k−a)(ℓ−1)])
pub

 = S˜


(X∗ | G∗)
(X∗ | G∗)([k−a])
...
(X∗ | G∗)([(k−a)(ℓ−1)])
(0 | G∗∗)
(0 | G∗∗)([k−a])
...
(0 | G∗∗)([(k−a)(ℓ−1)])


︸ ︷︷ ︸
G¯
σ.
Since 〈G∗∗〉 is a subcode of 〈G〉 of codimension a, by Assumption 1, we have with high
probability,
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈G∗∗〉([(k−a)i]) = Fnqm .
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Then, the bottom submatrix of G¯ has the same row span as [0 | In], and hence, by using
elementary operations, we can eliminate the second component of every row in the top
submatrix of G¯. Then, the space generated by the rows of G′′ext is the same as that
generated by
G′′′ext =


X∗ 0
(X∗)([k−a]) 0
...
...
(X∗)([(k−a)(ℓ−1)]) 0
0 In

σ.
By Assumption 2, with high probability we have that
ℓ−1∑
i=0
〈X∗〉([(k−a)i])
contains no elements of rank one, and therefore all elements of rank one in 〈G′′ext〉 = 〈G
′′′
ext〉
must belong to 〈[0 | In]〉σ. With the help of Lemma 3.13 we can recover a matrix
U ∈ F
n×(tˆ+n)
q which is a basis for 〈[0 | In]〉σ. Then, any parity check matrixHU ∈ F
tˆ×(n+tˆ)
q
for 〈[0 | In]〉σ must have the form
HTU = σ
−1
[
A
0
]
∈ F(n+tˆ)×tˆq ,
where A ∈ GLtˆ(Fq). It follows that, if we compute
GˆpubH
T
U = S[X | G]σH
T
U = SXA ∈ F
k×tˆ
qm ,
then there exists a unique matrix V = [A−1 | 0]σ ∈ F
tˆ×(n+tˆ)
q such that
GˆpubH
T
UV = SXAV = S[X | 0]σ.
We can find the matrix V by observing that
(Gˆpub − GˆpubH
T
UV )H
T
U = S[0 | G]σH
T
U = 0. (15)
This gives a linear system of equations with tˆ(n + tˆ) variables and k × tˆ equations over
Fqm . Since the variables can only take values in Fq, we can expand each equation into m
equations over Fq, obtaining a system of kmtˆ equations and tˆ(n + tˆ) variables over Fq.
Hence, we can solve this system of equations if km ≥ n+ tˆ (which is always satisfied).
Let HV ∈ F
n×(n+tˆ)
qm be any dual matrix for V . Then, HV has the form
HTV = σ
−1
[
0
B
]
,
for some B ∈ GLn(Fq). Therefore,
GˆpubH
T
V = S[X | G]σH
T
V = SGB ∈ F
k×n
qm
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is a Gabidulin code of minimum distance n−k+1, from which we can recover a decoding
algorithm, as explained in Subsection 2.1. If we receive an encrypted message of the form
mGˆpub + e,
we can apply HV , obtaining
mSGB + eHTV .
Since
rk(eHTV ) ≤ wtR(e) ≤ t
′,
we can recover the encrypted message, m, from the recovered decoding algorithm with
respect to SGB. All the operations required for this attack can be performed in polyno-
mial time.
We will conclude this section with an example where we analyze our attack against
the parameters proposed by Loidreau in [13] in order to resist Overbeck’s attack. It turns
out that the proposed parameters are not secure against our attack.
Example 5.5. Consider a Loidreau GGPT variant with q = 2, m = n = 24, k = 12,
a = 3, and tˆ = 40, i.e. the first set of parameters from Table 1. Assume we, as an
attacker, know the public generator matrix Gˆpub ∈ F
12×64
224
and received an encrypted
message y. We compute ℓ = ⌈ 2412−3⌉ = 3 and proceed as follows:
1. We compute Gˆ
([9])
pub , Gˆ
([18])
pub to obtain the extended matrix G
′′
ext ∈ F
36×64
224
. This
requires at most 1536 = 2 · 12 · 64 Frobenius powers in F224 . Using a normal basis
to represent F224 over F2, this can be done very efficiently.
2. We find the elements of rank one in 〈G′′ext〉, as described in Lemma 3.13. To do
so we need to row reduce G′′ext and then solve a linear system over F2 with 36
unknowns and 24 · 64 = 1536 equations. Then, if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, we
find some basis matrix U ∈ F24×642 , such that 〈U〉 contains all these elements of
rank one.
3. Compute a parity check matrix HU for U .
4. We find a matrix V ∈ F40×642 , solving Equation (15).
5. We compute a parity check matrix HV ∈ F
64×24
2 for V , and compute the product
GˆpubH
T
V .
6. We recover a decoding algorithm for the code 〈GˆpubH
T
V 〉, as described in Lemma
3.13, and decode yHTV with this algorithm.
We observe that step 4 above is the most computationally intensive, and therefore
we estimate the complexity of our attack based on this step. This is done by solving a
(40 · 64)× (24 · 12 · 40) system over F2 by Gaussian elimination on the resulting matrix.
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This requires on the order of 239 operations over F2. Implementing the algorithm on a
personal computer, we were able to break this system very efficiently.
For the parameters in the second row of the table, we can similarly break the system,
albeit with slightly higher complexity due the larger parameters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a new attack against cryptosystems based on Gabidulin codes,
reconfirming that Gabidulin based cryptosystems are vulnerable from a structural per-
spective. Our attack generalizes Overbeck’s attack, focusing instead on recovering the
elements of rank one, rather than the structure of the dual space. One principle advantage
of our attack is that it can be extended to cryptanalyze certain variants of the generalized
GPT system, which resist the original attacks of Gibson and Overbeck. In particular,
we show that the Smart Approach and Loidreau’s GGPT variants are vulnerable to this
attack.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, attacking a cryptosystem by looking at the
elements of rank one is a new approach which may need to be considered for the security
of existing and future rank-metric based cryptosystems. As a next step the authors want
to use this idea of finding elements of rank one to cryptanalyze the column scrambler
variant of [6], which has so far resisted structural attacks.
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